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Constructivism has a problem in accounting for agent-led change and for what motivates 
agents to make up their minds about how to put their agency to use. I show that 
constructivismÕs problem of change is related to tensions between constructivism's own key 
assumptions about the mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency, 
understanding of change and to an essentialist conception of identity. I argue that agency is 
constituted through processes of ÔidentificationÕ involving identity and narrative 
constructions and performance through practice and action. I make the perhaps 
controversial move to regard ontological security as a precondition for agent-led change 
and to identify ontological security maximisation as functionally equivalent to rationalist 
theoriesÕ agent assumption of utility maximisation. I identify two strategies for maximising 
ontological security; a Ôstrategy of beingÕ to secure a stable and esteem-enhancing identity 
and a strong narrative; and a Ôstrategy of doingÕ to ensure cognitive consistency through 
routinised practice whilst also undertaking action contributing to a sense of integrity and 
pride. The article concludes that although humans are endowed with agency, their actual 
ability to utilise their agency is severely constrained by their need for maintaining 
ontological security, which may explain why change appears so difficult to achieve. 
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The Problem of Change in Constructivist Theory 
Ontological Security Seeking and Agent Motivation 
 
One of the fundamental questions in International Relations is how to change the world into a better 
place. Yet, despite the normative aspirations to change dysfunctional, and often violent, practices, the 
IR discipline developed a widespread understanding that Ôthe internationalÕ was characterized by 
continuity and recurring patterns, and that the aspiration for making a better world, was an idealistic Ð 
even a utopian Ð project. The belief that change was unattainable became so ingrained in the discipline 
that when the Cold War ended, most had not even considered the possibility that such a change could 
take place
1
 and some even questioned its theoretical relevance
2
. Moreover, change was seen as one of 
those intellectual nettles that would be better left alone
3
 rather than as something that could be 
theorized, categorized and conceptualized or indeed used prescriptively
4
. Therefore when 
                                                
1
 See Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New 
York: Colombia University Press, 1996), pp. 1. See also the excellent piece by Hugh Gusterson, ÔMissing the end of the 
Cold War in International SecurityÔ in Jutta Weldes et. al. (eds), Cultures of Insecurity; States, Communities and the 
Production of Danger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 319-345. The chapter investigates all articles 
published in International Security in the three years prior to the end of the Cold War Ð finding that not a single one 
embraced the idea that the Cold War could end. 
2
 This was apparent at the seminar for the preparation of Lebow and Risse-Kappen International Relations Theory and the 
End of the Cold War, where one participant is said to have delegated the end of the Cold War to Ôa mere data point that 
could not be used to test or develop theoryÕ. The view was countered by a graduate student who suggested that by that logic 
Ôwe should give up the study of the Big Bang; it too was a data pointÕ. See ÔPrefaceÕ in Lebow and Risse-Kappen (1996). 
3
 Barry Buzan and R. J. Jones, Change and the Study of International Relations (London: Frances Pinter, 1981), pp. 1. In 
the book Buzan and Jones did Ôgrasp the nettleÕ although their analysis was constrained by the limited conceptual tool set 
available at the time. For example, Joseph Frankel mused Ôif our concern should be with change in ÔrealityÕ or if it was more 
a shift in our Ômental constructsÕ, ultimately dismissing the thought that IR should engage in analysis of changes in human 
expectation as a factor of IR because the area fell Ôwithin the domains of historians of ideas and was beyond the skills of the 
average social scientistÕ, Joseph Frankel, ÔPerspectives on ChangeÕ in Barry Buzan, and R.J. Barry Jones (eds.), pp. 231) 
4
 Paul du Gay and Signe Vikkels¿, ÔOn the lost specification of ÔchangeÕÕ, WMO Working Paper Series No 1, (Copenhagen: 
Department of Organization, Copenhagen Business School, 2012) 
 3 
constructivism entered the discipline proclaiming that Ôthe world is of our makingÕ
5
 and that Ôanarchy is 
what states make of itÕ
6
, it not only opened up a completely new research agenda focused on change 
and agency, but it also returned the discipline to its original normative aspiration to be able to prescribe 
how to make change happen.  
 
The new constructivist research agenda soon produced a voluminous literature enquiring into change.  
Emanuel Adler underlined the importance of change for constructivist research by suggesting that Ôif 
constructivism is about anything, it is about changeÕ
7
. Change has been central to all constructivist 
theorizing because of the fundamental premise that change is possible through the mutually constitutive 
relationship between structure and agency and the belief that the constancy of structure may be 
mitigated through agent practice, whilst agentsÕ identity and behaviour occasionally could be altered 
following structural change or through social processes of interaction
8
. Moreover with the 
constructivist insistence that structure is not just material but is ideas (nearly) all the way down
9
, 
relevant change was no longer just material structural change, but any kind of change that occurred 
when agents, through their performance altered the rules and norms that were constitutive of 
international interaction and in the process changed identities and hence interest
10
. The clear 
                                                
5
 Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations  (Columbia SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1989). 
6
 Alexander Wendt, ÕAnarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power PoliticsÕ, International 
Organization 46:2 (1992), p. 395-421. 
7
 Emmanuel Adler, ÔConstructivism and International RelationsÕ in Walter Carlsnaes et.al. (eds), Handbook of International 
Relations, p. 95-118, (London: Sage: 2002), p. 102. 
8
 Alexander Wendt, 'The agent-structure problem in international relations theory', International Organization, 41:3 (1987), 
pp. 339. 
9
 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 92. 
10
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms Dynamics and Political Change', International 
Organization 52:4 (1998), pp. 887-917. See also Killian Spandler, ÔThe political international society: Change in primary 
and secondary institutionsÕ Review of International Relations, 41:3 (2015), pp. 601-622, which combines constitution and 
institutionalization to explain change in response to external shocks and incremental change and institutional stability, pp. 
614. 
 4 
implication of constructivist theory was that if the world really is Ôwhat we make of itÕ, ÔweÕ, as 
individuals endowed with agency, can also Ôun-makeÕ recurrent dysfunctional practices. However, 
although there can be no doubt that constructivism has brought the discipline closer to understanding 
change, the promise of constructivist theory as an avenue for understanding change, and for prescribing 
how to achieve change, has arguably not been fully realized as constructivism seemed to develop a de 
facto focus on structure and stability rather than on agents and change. 
 
The article starts from the constructivist premise that agent-led change is possible albeit difficult. I 
argue that the problem of change in constructivist theory is rooted in tensions and contradictions within 
and between constructivismÕs own key assumptions, especially in the constructivist ontology of a social 
world consisting of structure and agency, in constructivismÕs essentialist conception of identity and in 
constructivismÕs incomplete conceptualization of change. Jeffrey Checkel has labeled the problem of 
change in constructivist theorizing as ÔcodeterminationÕ
11
 in which key concepts are seen 
simultaneously as sources of stability and sources of change, yet without it being clear what motivates 
agents to switch from one to the other
12
. The puzzle is that constructivist research identified norms, 
rules, identity, and practice as both elements of stability and as essential for bringing about change, yet 
also linked assumed human desires for stability and predictability to the same concepts
13
. This article is 
essentially an attempt to resolve the problem of codetermination in constructivist theory with the 
ambition to be able to more fully understand why intended agent-led change often falters and how to 
better achieve the goal of making change happen. The logical solution to the codetermination problem 
                                                
11
  Jeffrey Checkel ÔThe Constructivist Turn in International Relations TheoryÕ, World Politics, 50:1 (1998), pp. 346. 
12
 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, ÔRealism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading Author(s)Õ, 
International Studies Review, 4:1 (2002), pp. 93. 
13
 Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, ÔUnderstanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet EmpireÕs 
Demise and the International System, International Organization, 48:2 (1994), pp. 227; Sterling-Folker (2002), pp. 93. 
 5 
might be to scale down the constructivist reliance on social psychology, which arguably has led to the 
(implicit) emphasis on continuity by focusing on the human need for cognitive stability and 
predictability. However, rather than taking flight from the reliance on social psychology as a way to 
understand human motivation, I prefer the approach championed by Ned Lebow who suggests that a 
more multidimensional and nuanced understanding of human motives to include appetite, spirit and 
reason is the way forward
14
.  I therefore remain committed to an explicitly psychological form of 
constructivism
15
 centered on the self-constitution of agency through processes of identification and the 
suggestion that ontological security is a key concept for overcoming the Ôcodetermination problemÕ. 
 
The article proceeds in four main sections, starting out by locating ontological security as essential for 
the self-constitutive identification processes that are taking place at the agent level and as a decisive 
factor when agents decide to put their agency to use to undertake change-making action. I draw on the 
growing literature on ontological security to show that the search for ontological security is a primary 
motivational factor in all identification processes and a pre-condition for agents to use their agency 
strategically. In the second section I look more closely at the roots of the codetermination problem by 
focusing on constructivismÕs conception of the social world, identity and change, drawing on authors 




 and on the literature from Change Management
18
 to 
offer alternative conceptualizations, which may help to alleviate the codetermination problem. In the 
                                                
14
 Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
15
 For the link between a psycholgical form of constructivism and Ned LebowÕs Cultural Theory of International Relations, 
see Jacques Hymans, ÕThe Arrival of Psychological ConstructivismÕ, International Theory, 2:3 (2010), pp. 461-467  
16
 Hidemi Suganami, 'Agents, Structures, Narratives, European Journal of International Relations, 5:3 (1999), pp. 365-386. 
17
 Charlotte Epstein, 'Who Speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics', European 
Journal of International Relations, 17:2 (2011), pp. 327-350. 
18
 See for example Wanda Orlikowski, ÔImprovising Organizational Transformation Over Time: A Situated Change 
PerspectiveÕ, Information Systems Research, 7:1 (1996), pp. 65 and Karl E. Weick, ÔEmergent Change as a universal in 
OrganizationsÕ in Michael Beer and Nitin Nohria (eds.), Breaking the Code of Change (Harvard Business School Press, 
(2000), pp. 233. 
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third section the article moves inside the agent level to focus on agent-level identification processes and 
how the constitution of agency is an ongoing and always unfinished project arising from the 
Ôexperience of beingÕ, expressed through identity and narrative construction processes, and from the 
Ôexperience of doingÕ demonstrated through practice and action
19
 and with deep implications for the 
ongoing identity and narrative construction processes. Finally in the fourth section the article brings the 
strands together to present a constructivist framework for understanding agent-led change through 
ontological-security maximization, suggesting that all agents engage in time consuming ontological 
security-seeking strategies, and that only when a sufficient level of ontological security has been 
achieved are agents able and/or willing to undertake the kind of action that might lead to change.  
 
Ontological Security 
At its most basic level ontological security is Ôthe security of the selfÕ
20
. The concept was developed in 
the 1950s by psychiatrist R.D. Laing who described an ontologically secure person as Ôan individual 
that can be said to have a sense of his presence in the world as a real, alive, whole, and, in a temporal 
sense, a continuous personÕ
21
. Without ontological security there is a danger that the individual will be 
overwhelmed by anxieties that reach to the very roots of the individualÕs coherent sense of Ôbeing in the 
                                                
19
 Throughout this article I distinguish between ÕpracticeÕ and ÕactionÕ. I understand ÔpracticeÕ as defined by Emanuel Adler 
and Vincent Pouliot (eds) in International Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 6 as Ôcompetent 
performancesÕ. However, as suggested by Adler and Pouliot Ôaction are specific types of behavior and practices are a 
particular kind of action. I view ÕpracticeÕ as mainly concerned with competent routinized performance and ÕactionÕ as 
conceptualized by Charles Taylor in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985) as behaviour directed towards a specific goal and linked with desires, intentions and purposes Ð 
attributes that are not necessarily present in the more habitual practice based behaviour. 
20
 Jennifer Mitzen, ÕOntological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security DilemmaÕ, European Journal of 
International Relations, 12:3 (2006), pp. 341.  
21




. Importantly the ontologically insecure individual will be Ôpreoccupied with preserving rather 
than gratifying himselfÕ
23
 and so is unlikely to have a sense of agency or the inclination or ability to 
engage in social relationships or to undertake any form of action outside the narrow confines of simply 
preserving his or her own ÔbeingÕ. Moreover, from R.D. LaingÕs description of ontologically insecure 
individuals, it is apparent that ontologically insecure individuals do not display the normal range of 
motives for action such as Ôspirit, appetite and reasonÕ
24
. This is a point with hugely important 
implications for our understanding of why agents act the way they do. Yet, most IR theory either 
assume explicitly that agents act on the basis of reason and rationality or they assume, albeit implicitly, 
that agents are within a range of acceptable ontological security and hence have unimpeded agency and 
to be motivated in how they put their agency to use by one, or all, of the motives identified by Lebow. 
 
Anthony Giddens introduced ontological security into social science in his structuration theory in the 
1980s although the concept was not fully discovered by International Relations scholars until Brent 
Steele and Jennifer Mitzen (in separate articles) linked the concept to state identity and the security 
dilemma. Brent Steele
25
 suggested that the ontological security of states had been an overlooked form 
of security and that states wanted to maintain a consistent Self, which however could be undermined by 
state actions following a critical event, if the actions undertaken contradicted the values and norms on 
which the stateÕs identity was based. Importantly Steele suggested that actions that are not in 
accordance with the values and principles of the state would result in shame, which could lead to 
                                                
22
 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 
37 
23
 Laing; pp. 44 
24
 Lebow (2008); pp. 60. 
25
 Steele, Brent J, 'Ontological Security and the power of self-identity: British neutrality and the American Civil War', 
Review of International Studies, 31:3, (2005), pp. 519-540. 
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revisions of the stateÕs identity. In this sense Steele showed the need for coherence between identity, 
narrative and the actions undertaken by states as well as the importance of critical events for dislodging 
ontological security. Mitzen showed that ontological security is not necessarily related to action that is 
conventionally seen as ÔgoodÕ such as peaceful relations. In fact states may prefer to continue to engage 
in what would logically appear to be dysfunctional conflictual practices, because doing so reinforces 





Since the introduction of ontological security into International Relations, the relevance of the concept 
for the study of IR has been emphasized in a growing literature. In a general sense ontological security 
can be said to be present when an agent has a stable view of ÔselfÕ with a sense of order and continuity 
in regard to the future, relationships and experiences. Ontologically secure individuals are better able to 
realize their own agency because an ontologically secure individual is said to have a protective cocoon 
and a sense of ÔunrealityÕ to the many dangers that could threaten bodily or psychological integrity, 
which, if fully realized, would lead to paralysis in action as the individual would be overwhelmed by 
the many risks associated with living.
27
. To be ontologically secure is to possess ÔanswersÕ to 
fundamental and existential questions and to have Ôbasic trustÕ which can limit anxiety to a manageable 
level.
28
 Anxiety-management is important because anxiety is likely to paralyze agents, whereas fear is 
an altogether different kind of emotion arising from a specific threat, which may push agents to take 
action they would not otherwise have considered
29
. This is why Change Management often talks about 
                                                
26
 Mitzen (2006), pp. 346 
27
 Giddens (1991), pp. 40 
28
 Giddens (1991), pp. 47 
29
 Giddens (1991) pp. 43 
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creating Ôa burning platformÕ because the fear that would arise from being on a Ôburning platformÕ is 
likely to motivate individuals to undertake extraordinary action whereas anxiety will produce an urge to 
reinforce the agentÕs cognitive stability and confidence in the continuation of the known Ôlife worldÕ
30
. 
In order to limit anxiety to acceptable levels,
31
 individuals undertake routinization of everyday 
practices, which not only reinforce the individualÕs sense of being
32
 but which also provides coping 
mechanisms that regularize social life and provide confidence that the cognitive world will be 
reproduced. Routinized practices reinforce ontological security (at least until they for a variety of 
reasons may become dysfunctional) as they contribute to a stable cognitive environment. Yet, life also 
necessitates undertaking non-routine action and the ability to make, and cope with inevitable change
33
. 
An obsessive reliance on routines is a sign of a Ôneurotic compulsionÕ,
34





Giddens explains that identity is found in the capacity to keep a Ôstrong narrativeÕ going,
36
 which must 
incorporate a story about the self (who am I and what do I want) and past experience (what have I done 
and why).  It is clear that individuals care deeply about their own actions and that they are likely to 
experience either shame or pride when judging the success or failure of past actions with clear 
consequences for their self-esteem and their ability to maintain a Ôstrong narrativeÕ.
37
 Therefore, 
                                                
30
 Giddens (1991), pp. 47 
31 Mitzen (2006), pp. 342 
32
 Mitzen (2006) pp. 346 
33
 Ian Craib, Experiencing Identity (London, Sage, 1998) 
34
 Giddens (1991), pp. 40 
35
 Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, 'Escaping Security: Norden as a source of Ontologival Certainty', 
International Studies Assiocation. New Orleans (2010). 
36
 Giddens (1991), pp.  54. Giddens refers to Ôa particular narrativeÕ whereas I prefer the term Ôstrong narrativeÕ which I 
define as a narrative that supports the agentÕs identity and provides a sense of direction and understanding of past events and 
past actions. 
37
 Giddens (1991), pp. 36 
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although routinization of practice and a stable identity may be preferred by agents, action that changes 
established routines is sometimes a necessary undertaking, especially in response to disruptive events 
or unintended consequences
38
.  Moreover, as underlined by Mitzen, it is Ôa crucial requirement of 
individualsÕ self-understanding that actions can sustain it over timeÕ,
39
 as the consequences of action 
will influence on-going identification processes by reproducing, contradicting or changing self-
identifications.
40
 This point is also underlined by Charles Taylor who asserts that human agency is 





Since the introduction of ontological security to International Relations theory, a significant literature 
has emerged. In Critical Security Studies, the link between ontological security and physical security 
has been investigated to understand how securitized issues can be brought back to the realm of normal 
politics
42
 Ð or how to Ôun-makeÕ dysfunctional practices Ð by differentiating between Ôsecurity as beingÕ 
and Ôsecurity as survivalÕ. The interesting finding is that desecuritization need not take place through a 
social relationship with an ÔOtherÕ, but can also be achieved through self-constitutive identification 
processes
43
. The concept has been increasingly used by a new generation of constructivist scholars who 
see ontological security as a means of highlighting the analytical separation between ÔselfÕ and 
ÔidentityÕ and how the nature of Ôself-identityÕ is a Ôreflexive projectÕ that must be constantly Ôworked 
                                                
38
 Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Making sense of international practices', in Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (2011), pp. 47. 
39
 Mitzen (2006), pp. 344 
40
 Mitzen (2006), pp. 346 
41
 Charles Taylor, (1985), pp. 4. 
42
 Bahar Rumelili, ÕIdentity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical securityÕ, Journal of 
International Relations and Development, 18:1, (2013), pp. 1-13. 
43
 Rumelili: pp. 2 
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at, and striven for, across many different social and institutional contextsÕ
44
. In this understanding, 
emphasis is not on the stability of identities, but rather on how reflexivity towards identity within a 
constantly changing world requires continuous processes of identification and narrating the influence of 
Ôdislocatory eventsÕ that often compel agents to undertake action or to change their practice and to 
reflect on how events and action impact established identification and narrative processes
45
. From this 
perspective ontological security is not only of importance in those cases where it is lacking, but is 
important more generally for understanding identification processes as part of a reflexive project of 





Ontological security has also been utilized in the constructivist literature on the importance of 
biographical narratives and memory. For example Mailksoo has demonstrated that in a changing 
environment, memory becomes especially important as a temporal orientation devise that constitutes 
the central core of a biographical narrative
47
. In this connection what is important is not so much what 
happened, but rather what was remembered Ð especially what was incorporated into the biographical 
narrative. This is an issue of importance both to ontologically secure and insecure individuals/entities, 
because as shown by Stuart Croft, although the ontologically secure individual does not worry about 
the deeper meaning of life and although social interactions are largely unproblematic and based on 
inter-subjective understandings that define the boundaries of the normal, there is always a fragility and 
                                                
44
 OÕBrien, 1999 cited in Christopher Browning, ÕNation Branding, National Self-Esteem, and the Constitution of 
Subjectivity in Late ModernityÕ, Foreign Policy Analysis, 11:2, (2015), pp. 195-214: 197 
45
 Browning and Joennimi, ÕOntological Security, Self-articulation and Securitization of IdentityÕ, forthcoming Cooperation 
and Conflict, (2016), pp. 16 
46
 Browning and Joennimi (forthcoming, 2016), pp. 23 
47
 Maria Mlksoo, ÕMemory must be defendedÕ, Security Dialogue, 36:3 (2015), pp. 231-237: pp. 223
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precariousness to ontological security
48
 which means that even ontologically secure individuals need to 





The fragility and precariousness of ontological security is also underlined by Felix Berendskoetter, who 
suggests that identity is constituted through experience and knowledge structures which are constantly 
developing and which suggest that neither the ÔselfÕ nor Ôthe worldÕ are ever solidified but are 
constantly evolving
50
. Both need constant regrounding and adjustment in response to events and past 
actions and future visions. Drawing on HeideggerÕs ontology of Ôbeing-in-the-worldÕ (which Laing also 
used), Berendskoetter outlines how an entity (individual or state) is constituted through a narrative 
designating an experienced space, which seeks to give meaning to the past, as well as an envisioned 
space, which seeks to give meaning to the future
51
. Significant experiences Ð both good ones and bad 
ones Ð are likely to leave an imprint on the biographical narrative, which on each occasion is likely to 
require a re-configuration of the narrative and the related identification processes
52
. Therefore rather 
than just focusing on how identity is constituted in relations with others, the possibility of self-
constitutive processes based on reflexivity of past experience and evolving knowledge structures 
emerges. As a result, being ontologically secure does not mean having a stable identity, but rather that 
the ÔselfÕ is constantly re-constituted and regrounded on the basis of changing knowledge structures 
that are captured in narratives and incorporated into identification processes. As such, ontological 
                                                
48
 Stuart Croft, ÕConstructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of BritainÕs MuslimsÕ, Contemporary Security 
Policy, 33:2, (2012) pp. 219-235: pp. 223 
49
 Stuart Croft, (2012), pp. 221. 
50
 Felix Berenskoetter, ÕParameters of national biographyÕ, European Journal of International Relations, 20:1, (2014), pp. 
262Ð288 
51
 Berendskoetter (2014) pp. 264 
52
 Berendskoetter (2014) pp. 271 
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security is always a fragile and contingent condition which is constantly in danger of being destabilized 
by Ôdislocatory eventsÕ or of being undermined by behavior that is evaluated negatively by the external 
environment or by the individual/entity. 
 
Although ontological security as a concept initially was developed for understanding how individuals 
with severe psychological issues might experience their own existence and the limitations a lack of 
ontological security would place on their ability to function in the wider society, the concept holds 
considerable potential for understanding how agents are able to utilize their agency, and perhaps more 
importantly, how a lack of ontological security might severely limit the ability of agents to fully 
exercise their agency in a strategic way. In the following I draw on the literature on ontological security 
outlined here, to in the first instance return to the problem of codetermination in constructivist theory 
and then to outline a constructivist framework in which the continuous ÔregroundingÕ of ontological 
security appears to be central for understanding how (and when) agents are able to utilize their agency 
strategically to bring about change.  
 
Revisiting the social world, change and identity 
The problem of codetermination arises from the simultaneous belief that on the one hand change is 
possible through agent practice and changing ideational structures (such as norms), and on the other 
hand that the very same practices and norms have structural characteristics through their resilience
53
 
                                                
53
 Emanuel Adler, 'Resilient Liberal Practices' in Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart (eds.) Liberal World Orders (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013)  
 14 
derived from agents being hardwired to prefer the stability and cognitive consistency they provide
54
. 
This raises the question of how the impetus for change arises in the first place. In other words, if agents 
reproduce their own structural constraints though the very same quotidian practices and norms that are 
assumed to bring about change
55
 and they instinctively prefer stability to change, how does change ever 
take place? To move towards an answer to this question it is necessary to revisit constructivismÕs 
foundational assumption about the social world as a duality of structure and agency, which leads to a 
problematization of constructivismÕs understanding of external and internal sources of change.  
 
The ontology of the social world 
The constructivist conceptualization of the social world as consisting only of structure and agency, is a 
problem for understanding change because the possibility of change is restricted to structures changing 
through agent practice or agentÕs practice changing through structural shifts. I am persuaded by Hidemi 
Suganami that the constructivist reliance on the structure-agency dichotomy represents an incomplete 
understanding of the social world and that a more all-encompassing understanding of the social world 
is one that focuses on a trinity comprising of those elements of life that can be changed, those that canÕt 
and those that just happen by chance. Therefore rather than seeing the social world as consisting of just 
structure and agency, I follow Suganami (and strangely Singer) in understanding the social world as 
consisting of elements that can be described as Ôvoluntaristic, deterministic and stochasticÕ
56
. 
SuganamiÕs notion of the social world problematizes the constructivist foundational assumption that 
                                                
54
 Ted Hopf, 'The Logic of Habit in International Relations', European Journal of International Relations, 16:4 (2010) pp. 
555 
55
 Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', International Security, 23:1 (1998), pp. 
180. 
56
 Singer quoted in Suganami, (1999), pp. 369 
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structure and agency are mutually constituted,
57
 because it suggests that the mutual constitutiveness 
between agency and structure is only part of a wider process that also includes important self-
constitutive processes located inside the agent level, which are aditionally, as suggested by 
constructivism, influenced by structural (deterministic) factors but which are also influenced by other 
random (stochastic) factors that like the deterministic factors are located outside the agent level. By 
including other external (to the agent) factors than just structure, the well recognized influence from the 
occurrence of events, from social processes with other agents and from unintended consequences from 
agentsÕ own actions move into theoretical view as additional external sources of change. Moreover by 
opening up the agent level and looking inside the agent level, the reflexive (voluntaristic) agent based 
identification processes that are recognized in the literature on ontological security also move into 
theoretical view thereby providing a theoretical space for processes that were invisible (or bracketed) in 
early constructivist theory.  
 
With SuganamiÕs conception of the social world, it follows that agents are not social and cultural 
ÔdupesÕ blindly reacting to structural change or unthinkingly producing big change through endless 
minor modifications of their practice (although both of these also happen) but that agents (human 
beings) act with purpose and intention Ð sometimes to bring about change Ð but always to seek to 
maintain or establish their ontological security. In this article, I assume that agency is constituted 
through relational processes with externalities (structures, events and social relationships with other 
agents) and through internal sources of change found in the agentÕs self-constitutive identification 
processes, which involve significantly more self-reflection and self-constitution than is implied in most 
                                                
57
 Wendt (1999); Giddens (1984); David Dessler, 'What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?' International 
Organization, 43:3 (1989), pp. 441-473. 
 16 
constructivism.  This assumption is expressed later in the article in figure three in the shaded ring, 
which represents external sources of change conceptualized as deterministic and stochastic sources of 
change which are placed around the voluntaristic processes, which represent internal sources of change 
originating inside the agent level. 
 
Conceptualizing change and its external sources 
I have already alluded to the constructivist focus on change and the belief that dysfunctional practices 
can be Ôun-madeÕ through changes in agentsÕ identity and/or in the ideational milieu such as in 




 or in social deeds/rules
60
. The sources of such 
change is often assumed to be a Ôcritical junctureÕ which will have revealed a disconnect between the 
ideational structure and agentsÕ experience of who they are and what they do, where it is widely agreed 
that agents will suffer from severe cognitive dissonance, making them highly motivated to accepting 
transformative change for example by searching for a new norm set with a new identity and new 
associated practices and appropriate action
61
. However, the centrality of the Ôcritical junctureÕ in 
constructivist thinking about change is curious, because in a social world conceived as a duality of 
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The other widely cited source of change in constructivist theorizing is change as the result of processes 
of socialization in which one set of agents (or a social group) seek to induce identity or norm change  
in another group of agents. There is an extensive constructivist literature on socialization in which it is 
argued that in times of cognitive dissonance agents will be particularly open to influence from other 





simply by mimicking other agents
65
. The focus here is on how norms or other non-material forms of 
structure might be changed, which in turn might change identity and interests. Yet as pointed out by 
Felix Berenskoetter
66
 few early constructivists have offered substantial insights into identity and how it 
is formed, let alone how it informs action. Indeed Alexander Wendt
67
 stated explicitly that his version 
of constructivism was not concerned with the formation of identity. In this sense therefore the emphasis 
on socialization as a means to change norms and identity is also curious because not only are processes 
of socialization, processes that take place in an agent-agent constitutive relationship rather than in a 
mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency, but it is also unclear where in a social 
world conceived as a duality of structure and agency the motivations for some agents to seek to 
socialize other agents come from
68
. The main sources of change in constructivist theory Ð critical 
junctures and relational social processes such as socialization - leave constructivism with a problem of 
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accounting for emergent factors originating neither at the structural level nor at the agent level. 
Moreover, despite constructivismÕs rhetorical embrace of change, surprisingly little work has been 
undertaken on conceptualizing change and for understanding the many forms different forms change 
can take. Therefore in order to bring more depth and nuance to our thinking about change, it is 
instructive to look to the literature on Change Management.  
 
With inspiration from Change Management theory, I use a two-pronged approach to inquire into the 
Ôform of changeÕ in terms of location, object and experience, and by distinguishing between different 
Ôprocesses of changeÕ in terms of them being planned, emergent, evolutionary or revolutionary.
69
 I 
identify three different Ôforms of changeÕ; one located at the structural level characterized by change in 
material, institutional and ideational elements
70
 as well as two agent-level forms of change Ð one in the 
experience of ÔbeingÕ observable in agentsÕ identity, knowledge and narrative and the other in agentsÕ 
experience of ÔdoingÕ demonstrated in their performance through practice, action and social relations. 
Constructivism has over the years been engaged with all three processes of change, but their difference 
has not been explicitly been noted. These different forms of change are experienced as changes either 
in the material, ideational or discursive milieu of the agent or as change in Ôwho I amÕ and in Ôwhat I 
doÕ. The different forms of change are summarized below. 
 
Figure 1: Forms of change 
Location of change Object of change Experience of change 
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Structural level Material, institutional, ideational Change in my milieu 
Agent level Ð ÔbeingÕ Identity, knowledge and narrative Change in who I am  
Agent level Ð ÔdoingÕ Practice, action and social relations Change in what I do  
 
Apart from different forms of change, change also takes place through different processes. Generally 
speaking IR has operated with assumptions about the process of change being either intentional and 
progressive towards a particular vision or as being characterized by agentsÕ habitual practice 
occasionally interrupted by crises
71
. Curiously, the importance of events has been on the one hand 
clearly visible through the emphasis on Ôcritical juncturesÕ Ð or perhaps better termed Ôdislocatory 
eventsÕ and on the other hand as almost absent from theoretical discussions because Ôevent-drivenÕ 
change has been dismissed as ÔreactiveÕ as opposed to the more desirable ÔstrategicÕ change. However, 
given Harold MacMillanÕs memorable answer when asked what was most likely to throw a government 
off course: Ôevents my dear boy Ð eventsÕ
72
, the failure to theoretically account for the occurrence of 
events seems a major deficiency in constructivist theorizing on change. It seems clear therefore that a 
first step towards a more complete understanding of processes of change is to be aware of the different 
change processes Ôout thereÕ and to theoretically open up for the possibility of accounting for events. 
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Again it is instructive to look to Change Management where the necessity of theoretically accounting 




On the one hand, change can be said to be continuous and ever present as agents and structures alike 
are always in a process of becoming.
74
 In this understanding, change is a temporal entity inextricably 
tied to an imagined future of the self and a narrative about the journey towards the imagined endpoint 
of the process of becoming. This is the view of change that has been most prominent in constructivist 
theorizing in IR. But change can also be characterized by episodes marked by events or by actions 
undertaken by the agents that may have unintended consequences and which may at any time alter the 
direction and speed of the process of becoming.
75
 These processes can be conceptualized as either 
planned or emergent
76
, where Ôemergent changeÕ is random and takes place when new patterns of 
performance emerge in the absence of explicit a priori intentions.
77
 In this conception change can be 
either evolutionary or revolutionary,
78
 depending on whether the ÔepisodeÕ is a critical Ð or dislocatory - 
event, leading to transformation of the existing milieu, or if the ÔepisodeÕ is simply a minor event 
requiring adjusted performance within the existing structural environment. With the insights from 
Change Management, processes of change can be described as emergent, planned, evolutionary and 
revolutionary as outlined in the matrix below. 
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Figure 2: Ideal-type change processes 
 Evolutionary Revolutionary 
Planned Strategic gradual change Strategic transformation 
Emergent Event-driven gradual change Crisis-driven transformation 
 
The four possible change processes outlined here are of course ideal-types that are unlikely to be found 
in their pure form in actual change processes and clearly the three forms of change (outlined in figure 
1) cannot easily be separated as I have done. In Ôreal lifeÕ the three forms of change are likely to be 
highly interconnected and mutually constitutive, where the different forms of change will continuously 
impact on the agentsÕ Ôexperience of beingÕ and Ôexperience of doingÕ, which will result in continuous 
processes of identity and narrative constructions and in adjustments to changes in the shared 
knowledge, all of which is contingent on (rare) changes at the structural level (deterministic factors) as 
well as the (more frequent) occurrence of events (stochastic factors). In Ôreal lifeÕ agents are faced with 
the challenge of having to navigate strategically in an emergent environment characterized by the 
continuous occurrence of events, unintended consequences of past action and the occasional crisis. The 
theoretical (and indeed practical) challenge therefore is to understand change as varied in both form 
and process and as something that places high demands on agentsÕ ability to reflect on their actions and 
use their agency strategically to bring about the desired change Ð preferably without detrimental 
consequences for agentsÕ self-esteem and standing. In practice this probably means that to make change 
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happen, agents will be engaged in a continuous struggle to manage emergent change, unintended 
consequences and to occasionally be disrupted by crises that require the undertaking of 
transformational change Ð all of which will require regrounding of the agentsÕ ontological security. To 
understand these processes, it is necessary to move to the second consequence of the Suganami-
inspired social ontology, which is to look for the sources of change located inside the agent level. 
 
Identity and internal sources of change 
Constructivists believe that change can be achieved through identity change because identity is linked 
to interests, which will influence behaviour. However, constructivists (at least conventional ones) also 
adhere to an essentialist view of identity, which logically means that identities are pre-constituted and 
fixed. Moreover by focusing on change as something that (almost) inevitably follows crisis and by 
emphasizing norms as something that comes part and parcel with a socio-culturally determined identity 
and appropriate behavior located in different pre-existing social groups, constructivists shied away 
from engaging in a deeper understanding of the reflexivity preceding norm and identity change and 
from understanding what other factors than cognitive dissonance might motivate agents to undertake 
changes in their identity and in their behaviour. This focus was perhaps understandable within the 
context of the early constructivist attempt to counter neorealism, but as suggested by Charlotte Epstein, 
it brought constructivism on a path that assumed the self to be fully formed prior to engagement with 
structure
79
. Constructivism effectively sought reconciliation between a structural, systemic focus that 
required positing given units and appraising them from the outside, while emphasizing effects that 
called into question the assumed given-ness and which required opening up the units.
80
 As we saw 
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above in the section on ontological security, this issue has been taken up by a new generation of 
constructivists who ask how identities are constituted and what motivates actors to realize the 
possibilities of ÔbeingÕ and ÔdoingÕ
81
 and more generally to appreciate the multifaceted nature of human 




One of the first approaches to try to understand the connection between identity, norms and behavior 
was to use social identity theory (SIT) for answering why agents associate themselves with certain 
identities and take on certain norm sets with specific behavioural expectations.  Drawing on the 
literature from social psychology such as Henri Tajfel
83
 and John Turner,
84
 constructivists argued that 
agents strive to maximize their self-esteem
85
 by gaining membership of highly ranked social groups. It 
was argued that membership of a social group would require agents to take on the identity of the social 
group and to behave in accordance with the groupÕs socially sanctioned norms. Agents would be 





 Moreover, from narrative theory
88
 constructivists could point to how the identity of the 
individual and the social group continuously would be presented through on-going narrative 
constructions which would at all times seek to ensure positive emplotment and sense-making of the 
past by incorporating continuously occurring events into a narrative providing biographical continuity 
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and supporting the identity of the social group.
89
 The relationship between identity and narrative is 
widely acknowledged but has been specifically linked by Felix Ciut
90
 through what he calls the 
Ônarrative shuttleÕ. Ciut sees the narrative shuttle as an ongoing process in which narratives and 
identities are continuously reinterpreted and realigned against each other in a process of ÔshuttlingÕ 
back and forth between ongoing narrative and identity construction processes, producing a continuous 
(re)constitution of narratives and identities and incorporating the occurrence of events and evaluation 
of performance. 
 
Despite the contributions from social identity theory and narrative theory, the implicit assumption 
about the essentialist self was not fully overcome because it simply moved the question from one 
assumed given identity to a choice between several available, but fully formed, identities. Moreover, 
the constructivist foundational idea of a dialectic between structure and agency has meant that 
constructivism has struggled to demonstrate how agency is constituted and why, once constituted, 
agents might sometimes use their agency to bring about change. The turn to practice within 
constructivist theory has moved constructivist research some way towards addressing this issue by 
recognizing practice as not just a mechanical form of routinized performance but also as constitutive of 
agency. In this view practice is not just a means for gradually changing structure as advocated in early 
constructivism but is actually constitutive of the agency that can undertake change.
91
 As Theodor 
Schzatzki notes, practice is about Ôhow humans do their very being in the worldÕ
92
 and how they 
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organize human life, establish social order and transform the social orders they create. The Ôpractice 
turnÕ is an important point in the continuous development of constructivism towards overcoming some 
of the problems associated with ÔcodeterminationÕ because it challenges some of the assumptions about 
change made during the initial stages of constructivist thinking and it avoids many of the traditional 
dichotomies between stability and change, agency and structure as well as between ideas and matter.
93
 
Even so practice theory does not fully account for the motivational issue of why agents sometimes 
make the strategic choice of seeking change by altering the established practices that they are said to 
value.  
 




, Browning and Joeniemmi
96
 and others that identity cannot be 
assumed to be pre-constituted, but that it is continuously constituted in processes of ÔidentificationÕ
97
 in 
complex and interlinked processes of agentsÕ identity and narrative constructions and their performance 
through practice and action. The assumption of a mutually constitutive relationship between structure 
and agency severely limits the theoretical scope for accounting for self-constitutive processes at the 
agent level, and for other external stimuli than structural factors, and it therefore requires opening up 
the agent level for further scrutiny. However, even with opening up the agent level to look at the self-
constitutive identification processes taking place there, the assumption that agents prefer stability, 
leaves little room for self-constituted identity change. This is where the emerging literature on 
ontological security can offer insights into the micro-foundations of agentsÕ behavior and identity 
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 because the literature on ontological security suggests that people are much more reflexive 
about themselves and their actions than is usually acknowledged by constructivist theory. 
The framework developed in this article, rests to a large degree on the insights from social psychology 
and from the IR literature on ontological security.   
 
Inside the agent-level - ontological security as motivation for utilizing agency 
If the question is how and when agents make decisions to undertake action that can lead to change at 
any one of the three ÔlocationsÕ identified in figure 2, given that two out three forms of change are 
located at the agent level, our focus has to be the agent itself, how agency is constituted and the 
conditions necessary for agents to use their agency purposefully. I start from the rather simple premise 
that agency entails ÔbeingÕ and ÔdoingÕ implying a ÔselfÕ defined by an identity, articulated through a 
narrative and performed through practice and action, which is continuously re-grounded as a reflexive 




The literature on ontological security suggests that ontologically secure individuals are individuals who 
although they may prefer a stable cognitive environment, have the ability to undertake change-making 
action when needed and who can cope with the change it induces and who are able to continuously 
incorporate change into their narrative and identity constructions. Moreover, based on the literature 
from social psychology
100
 it seems reasonable to assume that all individuals develop a framework for 
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maximizing their ontological security through their ÔbeingÕ in terms of identity and narrative and their 
ÔdoingÕ in terms of practice and action. Ontological security can therefore be assumed to significantly 
influence the ability (or willingness) of agents to exercise their agency by undertaking the kind of 
action that might lead to change. Moreover from the literature on ontological security it seems that the 
maximization of ontological security can be seen as an important motivational factor in the self-
constitutive processes taking place inside the agent level. From that I make the perhaps controversial 
move to regard ontological security maximization as functionally equivalent to rationalist theoriesÕ 





By adopting SuganamiÕs understanding of the social world and by understanding agency as constituted 
inside the agent level through ÔbeingÕ and ÔdoingÕ, it is possible to connect the different forms and 
processes of change into one overall framework in which identity, narrative, practice and action are all 
connected through the basic need for human beings to at all times maintain a sufficient level of 
ontological security. The agent-level identification processes and their connection to ontological 
security and the influence of stochastic and deterministic factors are illustrated graphically in figure 
three, in which the four ÔboxesÕ illustrate the Ôexperience of beingÕ in the identity and narrative 
construction processes as well as the Ôexperience of doingÕ through the performance of practice and 
action. The identification processes have been placed inside the shaded ring, with the ring representing 
the many stochastic and deterministic factors, which continuously will exert influence on agents and 
their identification processes. The bracketing of the stochastic and deterministic factors should not be 
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read as a downgrading of their importance, but is simply an acknowledgement of the great variety of 
stochastic and deterministic factors that are constantly bombarding agents and providing new input to 
the self-constitutive voluntaristic processes continuously taking place inside the shaded area. The many 
possibilities for stochastic and deterministic influences include (but is not limited to) critical junctures 
through gradual and sudden structural change, the constant occurrence of events Ð dislocatory ones as 
well as minor ones, intended and unintended consequences arising from agentÕs own actions as well as 
stimulus from social relations with other agents through for example socialization, persuasion or 
through learning from the behavior of others as well as material change in for example infrastructure or 
the natural environment.  
Figure 3: Voluntaristic dentification processes inside the agent-level 
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Change-making action will necessarily undermine cognitive stability by undoing the very practices that 
ensure cognitive stability, and it will require adjustments in agentsÕ identity and narratives. Logically 
therefore, change is always difficult to achieve because the agent action that is supposed to bring about 
change is difficult to sustain, as the inevitable disturbances in agentsÕ cognitive stability as well as 
changes in identity and narratives might lead to anxiety and hence a reduction in ontological security, 
which might result in paralysis rather than the ability to undertake action. This link may indeed explain 




Although change making action necessarily will undermine the aspect of ontological security that is 
associated with cognitive consistency, because individuals reflect and care deeply about their 
performance, action that is perceived to be successful can offer the prospect of strengthening 
ontological security by providing the individual with a sense of pride and a positive impact on self-
esteem - or if action is perceived as unsuccessful Ð it can undermine ontological security. This is a 
crucial point because the connection between ontological security and action (represented in figure 
three by the arrow from ontological security to action) is only likely to be active when the level of 
ontological security is sufficient enough to afford agents the emotional capacity to undertake non-
routine action. Moreover, whether such action will be a one-off or whether it can be sustained over 
time depends on the perceived success of the action, as unsuccessful action will result in negative 
adjustments in identity and narrative constructions and in more time consuming processes of shuttling 
back and forth on the narrative-identity shuttle until ontological security can be re-established. This 
stands in contrast to situations where the action is deemed successful. In such a situation agents are 
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likely to feel confident and enthusiastic about undertaking further change making action and thereby 
open up for the (rare) possibility of a sustainable change process.  
 
Ontological security maximizing strategies  
Given the vexatious nature of social reality caused especially by the continuous influence from 
stochastic and deterministic factors and the necessity of agents continually having to readjust their 
identity, narrative and practice in response to stochastic and deterministic influences, ontological 
security is a fragile and transient condition that must be endlessly re-constituted and reasserted.
103
 In 
doing so, agents are constantly engaged in costly (in terms of attention) and time-consuming processes 
of seeking to maximize their ontological security.
104
 I identify two strategies for maximizing 
ontological security; a Ôstrategy of beingÕ focused on the nexus between narrative and identity 
constructions and aiming to secure a stable and esteem-enhancing identity and biographical continuity 
through the construction of a Ôstrong narrativeÕ; and a Ôstrategy of doingÕ focused on the seemingly 
paradoxical relationship between practice and action to, on the one hand, uphold a stable cognitive 
environment through routinized practice whilst at the same time being able to undertake change-
producing action in reaction to stochastic and deterministic factors that can also contribute to 
maintaining a sense of individual integrity and pride. The two strategies are inter-linked and mutually 
constitutive and cannot be understood in isolation from each other Ð or in isolation from the constant 
influence of deterministic and stochastic factors.  
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In the Ôstrategy of beingÕ, I build on CiutÕs narrative shuttle by arguing that agents are primarily 
engaging in the Ônarrative shuttleÕ with the aim of achieving coherence between narrative and identity 
at the highest level possible in terms of a positive and status giving identity, which can enhance self-
esteem and which is supported by a convincing and positive narrative that can incorporate all 
voluntaristic, stochastic and deterministic influences and provide biographical continuity. The point 
where this aim is achieved is where the agent has Ôontological securityÕ, which in figure three is the 
point graphically expressed by the ÔupwardÕ move from the ÔsmileyÕ line into the Ôontological security 
bubbleÕ. The aim of the ontological security seeking strategy of being is to reach and maintain this 
point in the process. 
 
At a first glance the establishment of a stable, esteem enhancing identity supported by a Ôstrong 
narrativeÕ seems to be a relatively easy undertaking as there often is considerable scope for ÔselectivityÕ 
and ÔcreativityÕ in narrative constructions and in possible identity constructions. SIT has been used 
extensively in constructivist theorizing to show how identities are constituted through membership of a 
social group, which is of paramount importance for simultaneously providing individuals with their 
identity and self-esteem.
105
 According to SIT, individuals will attach value to any social group they are 
member of Ð no matter the actual qualities of the social group.
106
 In this view even individuals who 
may be unable to gain access to a highly ranked social group are able to seek affirmation of their self-
identity by drawing closer to alternative groups (such as gangs) or to a more open collective group 
(such as a religious group) and in doing so may reduce their insecurity and anxiety by providing core 
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Ôidentity signifiersÕ such as religion or nationalism.
107
 Therefore if, as outlined in the previous section, 
ontologically secure individuals are individuals with a stable esteem-enhancing identity supported and 
reinforced by a Ôstrong narrativeÕ, ontological security should be in reach of most no matter their actual 
position in society.
108
 Following this logic, strategies for maximizing ontological security through the 
narrative-identity nexus, span from attempting to join highly ranked social groups (available only to the 
lucky few) to joining more open groups which provide identity signifiers albeit at a much lower level, 
but which can enable the formulation of a narrative which emphasizes alternative ways of achieving 
pride, honor and self-esteem. However, as shown in figure three, the narrative shuttle is not a self-
contained process, and even though the Ôstrategy of beingÕ primarily takes place on the identity-
narrative shuttle, narrative and identity constructions are also influenced by deterministic and stochastic 
factors and by the two other agent-level voluntaristic elements of the model - practice and action. As 
was pointed out by Stuart Croft
109
, the precariousness of ontological security is therefore always a 
factor in the calculations of agents. 
 
Apart from engaging in ontological security maximization through a Ôstrategy of beingÕ, individuals 
will also seek to maximize their ontological security through a Ôstrategy of doingÕ. Maximizing 
ontological security through the strategy of doing will however depend on whether the practice and 
action undertaken reinforce the identification processes to produce self-esteem and biographical 
continuity and hence to reach the point in figure three of the ÔupwardÕ move from the ÔsmileyÕ line into 
the Ôontological security bubble. This corresponds with one of the major claims of practice theory - that 
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practice has been an important, but largely overlooked, influence on both narrative and identity as both 
are constituted and reified through social practice.
110
 Moreover, as noted by Giddens, individuals are 
not ambivalent about the nature of their actions, but care deeply about the success or failure of their 
actions with significant repercussions on their self-evaluations
111
. These claims and their connection to 
the Ôstrategies of doingÕ are important because input into the narrative-identity nexus from the ÔactionÕ 
and ÔpracticeÕ elements in figure three will prompt changes in identity and/or narrative, giving rise to 
further rounds of shuttling back and forth on the Ônarrative shuttleÕ before the ÔupwardÕ move to 
ontological security is possible. In practical terms this means that the maintenance of ontological 
security over time is likely to be demanding and to involve costly and time-consuming processes that 
can appear to be Ônavel contemplatingÕ whilst agents Ôself-analyzeÕ and seek to formulate the necessary 
strong narrative. However, although practice and action are both intricately tied up with ontological 
security Ð this is so in different ways, which is why I, in contrast to most constructivist and practice 
theory, distinguish between the two. 
 
Routine practices are likely to always have a mildly reinforcing effect on the narrative and identity 
construction processes and hence on ontological security by providing a stable, and largely taken-for-
granted cognitive environment. Ontological security seeking will therefore involve routinization of 
practices as far as possible. But whereas routinized practices are likely to reinforce the important sense 
of order, stability and basic trust that is necessary for ontological security, it is unlikely to provide 
agents with any sense of pride or enhanced self-esteem, and practice certainly does not lead to change 
and may eventually be perceived as dysfunctional if practices are not adjusted in reaction to stochastic 
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and deterministic factors. Moreover if change in practice result in even a temporary ÔdisconnectÕ 
between practice and the existing narrative-identity nexus, this is likely to give rise to an identity crisis 
and/or a crisis narrative.
112
 Once such a ÔdisconnectÕ between practice and the narrative-identity nexus 
is realized, it is likely to have detrimental effects on ontological security and to lead to a new time-
consuming process of shuttling back and forth on the narrative shuttle to re-establish ontological 
security. Whilst agents are busy shuttling back and forth on the narrative shuttle, they are less likely to 
have the inclination to take on new action Ð even when change is clearly needed.  
 
Although all four elements of the model Ð a stable and esteem-enhancing identity supported by a 
ÔstrongÕ narrative and reinforced through practice and action Ð are necessary for the maintenance (and 
re-establishment) of ontological security, the action element may only be actuated occasionally, as 
agents prefer the status quo sustained through practice to the change that could be attained through 
action. Moreover, paradoxically even successful action will (at least initially) undermine ontological 
security because it will necessarily change the very practices that provide cognitive stability. Added to 
this is that there is always a risk that action may be unsuccessful, which could lead to negative 
emotions such as shame and frustration and hence that it undermines ontological security rather than 
reinforce it. Moreover, if a change process is to be sustainable, the action undertaken must be perceived 
by the agents themselves as successful Ð meaning that the changed practices and resulting cognitive 
disturbance can be evaluated positively Ð which, given the paradox that agents prefer stability yet need 
self-esteem Ð is difficult to achieve.   
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If agents evaluate their action positively and are able to cope with the ensuring cognitive inconsistency, 
a dynamic and expanding change process might be initiated.
113
 Such action is Ôreinforcing actionÕ 
providing agents with positive emotions such as pride, enthusiasm and confidence, which is likely to 
produce a Ôcan doÕ attitude and willingness to initiate further action. However, action that is deemed 
unsuccessful and which fails to positively contribute to the on-going narrative and identity 
constructions and which is evaluated negatively by agents, is Ôundermining actionÕ which may produce 
negative emotions such as shame, frustration and uncertainty. Unsuccessful action will usually be 
terminated causing the change process to fizzle out, but in those cases where termination is not possible 
(for example a military intervention or a contractual relationship), a negative and undermining dynamic 
may be the result with severely detrimental consequences for ontological security. This is a risk that 
one must assume will always be part of agentsÕ calculations of whether or not to undertake change-
making action.  
 
Given that undermining action can have severely detrimental effects on ontological security, it seems 
reasonable to assume that agents will be reluctant to undertake change-making action unless they are 
fairly certain of the action being rated as successful. The crucial question for agents seeking ontological 
security is therefore whether action is likely to be reinforcing or undermining. In day-to-day life, agents 
seeking ontological security will pursue the relatively safe option of simply engaging in practice that is 
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in line with the agentsÕ narrative and identity and which will furnish them with cognitive stability. 
Because such practice is habitual, it is unlikely to prompt agents to question the existing narrative-
identity nexus, but nor is it likely to provide them with any sense of pride or enthusiasm.  The problem 
is that all negative influences from within the voluntaristic processes such as dysfunctional practices or 
undermining action and from external stochastic and deterministic factors are likely to block for the 
undertaking of new action. Moreover the number of stochastic factors, which might not be successfully 
incorporated into the on-going narrative and identity constructions are so plentiful that they are 
probably the norm rather than the exception.  
 
The intricate relationship between identity, narrative, action and practice and the clear relationship 
between the two ontological security seeking strategies may well explain why change Ð especially 
sustainable change Ð seem so difficult to achieve.  In the model illustrated in figure three, a positive and 
dynamic process of change is only likely when sustained reinforcing action is taking place (illustrated 
with the thick arrow from the Ôontological security bubbleÕ to the Ôaction bubbleÕ), and when both 
ontological security seeking strategies are successfully invoked, and only for as long as action remains 
reinforcing. In the absence of ontological security, agents have only limited surplus or inclination to 
undertake new action, but will concentrate on routinized practices, as they may contribute to an 
acceptable level of ontological security, but are unlikely to motivate action beyond maintaining the 
status quo. Given the infinite number of possible external influences to interrupt the search for 
ontological security, coupled with the certainty that changes in practice will lead to cognitive 
dissonance and the significant risk that agentsÕ own action may not be successful or may have negative 
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unintended consequences, it is no wonder that sustained change processes are rare or that constructivist 
theory has struggled to understand why continuity seemed to trump change.  
 
Conclusion 
The article set out with the aim of addressing the dilemma of codetermination in constructivist 
theorizing about change by seeking to identify the motivations for agent-led change and to take a step 
in the direction of a more comprehensive constructivist understanding of why change appears to be 
difficult to explain for constructivists and difficult to undertake for agents. The article found that 
although arguably Ôconstructivism is all about changeÕ, constructivism has actually operated with a 
rather limited understanding of change, which in particular has not accounted for the emergent nature 
of change and has tended to focus either on the influence of structural factors or on change in identity 
or change in practice, but rarely on all three forms of change together.  The introduction of ontological 
security as a key motivation for undertaking Ð or not undertaking Ð change making action has not only 
provided a deeper understanding of why agents only sometimes choose to put their agency to use, but 
has also offered a linkage between the different change processes and forms of change that 
constructivist theory has engaged with separately. In doing so, the framework that has been presented 
here is able to account for influences that are not normally considered when trying to explain one of the 
most enduring questions of International Relations Ð how to make change happen Ð especially how to 
change dysfunctional practices. Moreover, by focusing on deterministic and stochastic factors rather 
than the conventional agent-structure duality, the framework is able to incorporate all conceptions of 
structure - including material, social, ideational and discursive forms, and by introducing stochastic 
factors Ð it is able to theoretically account for all the Ôother stuffÕ, which clearly influence the ways in 
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which we perceive ourselves and judge what constitute relevant action. This is important because as 
rather bluntly put by former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, Ôshit happensÕ, which 
inevitably impacts decisions and policy, but which is rarely addressed theoretically.  
 
The focus on ontological security as a primary motivational factor for agentsÕ to use their agency 
strategically to alter the status quo, suggests that although human beings are endowed with agency and 
certainly appear to be more reflexive about their agency than is often acknowledged, their actual ability 
to utilize their agency is severely constrained by their need for maintaining ontological security.  Once 
the scope of investigation is opened up to different forms of change and different processes of change 
and with a view of the social world as a trinity consisting of things that can be changed, things that 
canÕt and things that just happen, the interconnectedness of the different processes and the extent of 
agent-level reflexivity prior to engaging in action that might lead to change move into theoretical view. 
For those with a normative agenda of Ômaking change happenÕ the new view of the field of change is 
certainly not a comforting one, because the model outlined in this article clearly shows the infinite 
number of possible obstacles standing in the way of sustained change.  
 
Although the influence of the great variety of stochastic and deterministic factors certainly is important 
to take into account, the article has focused on the voluntaristic self-constitutive identification 
processes taking place at the agent level.  The specific contribution here is that by focusing on these 
self-constitutive agent level processes and by introducing ontological security as a precondition for 
agency, the model does not rely on an essentialist conception of the self, but is fully aware of the 
complex processes invoked in the constitution of the self.  Moreover, by combining several theoretical 
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approaches such as SIT, narrative and practice theory and by distinguishing between practice and 
action, the model is able to overcome the weaknesses of each of its constitutive elements. By opening 
up the agent level to focus on the self-constitutive agent-level processes as two inter-linked and 
mutually constitutive strategies for maximizing ontological security, a new dimension has been 
achieved to add to our understanding of the prior constitutive processes and motivations that influence 
agents in making up their minds about how to put their agency to use.  
 
 
